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Abstract
Approved client-server authentication mechanisms are described for the
IVOA single-sign-on profile: No Authentication; HTTP Basic Authenti-
cation; TLS with passwords; TLS with client certificates; Cookies; Open
Authentication; Security Assertion Markup Language; OpenID. Normative
rules are given for the implementation of these mechanisms, mainly by ref-
erence to pre-existing standards. The Authorization mechanisms are out of
the scope of this document.
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Status of This Document
This document has been reviewed by IVOA Members and other inter-
ested parties, and has been endorsed by the IVOA Executive Committee
as an IVOA Recommendation. It is a stable document and may be used
as reference material or cited as a normative reference from another docu-
ment. IVOA’s role in making the Recommendation is to draw attention to
the specification and to promote its widespread deployment. This enhances
the functionality and interoperability inside the Astronomical Community.
A list of current IVOA Recommendations and other technical documents
can be found at http://www.ivoa.net/documents/.
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Conformance-related definitions
The words “MUST”, “SHALL”, “SHOULD”, “MAY”, “RECOMMENDED”,
and “OPTIONAL” (in upper or lower case) used in this document are to be
interpreted as described in IETF standard, Bradner (1997).
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The Virtual Observatory (VO) is general term for a collection of feder-
ated resources that can be used to conduct astronomical research, education,
and outreach. The International Virtual Observatory Alliance (IVOA) is a
global collaboration of separately funded projects to develop standards and
infrastructure that enable VO applications.
1 Introduction
IVOA’s single-sign-on architecture is a system in which users assign crypto-
graphic credentials to user agents so that the agents may act with the user’s
identity and access rights. This standard describes how agents use those
credentials to authenticate the user’s identity in requests to services. This
standard describes also the authentication mechanism of an application or
a service making a call (on behalf of someone or something else) to an API
or to another service. This document is essentially a profile against existing
security standards; that is, it describes how an existing standard should be
applied in an IVOA application to support single sign-on capabilities in the
IVOA. In the following sections, we make specific references to details spelled
out in these standards. For the purposes of validating against this standard,
those referenced documents should be consulted for a full explanation of
those details. Unfortunately, a reader that is unfamiliar with these external
standards might find this specification confusing. To alleviate this problem,
each major section is concluded by a Commentary subsection that provides
some explanations of the detailed terms and concepts being referred to. The
Commentary subsection may also provide recommended scenarios for how
this specification might actually be realised. Note that the statements in the
Commentary subsections are non-normative and should not be considered
part of precise specification; nevertheless, they are indicative of the intended
spirit of this document.
1.1 Role within the VO Architecture
Fig. 1 shows the role this document plays within the IVOA architecture
(Arviset and Gaudet et al., 2010).
2 Scope of this standard
2.1 Requirements
When a service is registered in an IVOA registry, that service’s resource
document MAY include metadata expressing conformance to one or more of
the authentication mechanisms approved in the IVOA SSO profile. Such a
service MUST implement those mechanisms as described in this document,
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Figure 1: Architecture diagram for this document
and clients of the service MUST participate in the mechanism when calling
the service. If a service does not provide any SSO specification it is assumed
that no authentication is required. The registration of the service interface
SHALL contain an XML element of type SecurityMethod as specified in
the XML schema for VOResource (Plante and Benson et al., 2008). The
value of this element distinguishes the authentication mechanism using the
values stated in the sections below. Services registered without the metadata
alluded to above need not support any authentication mechanism. If they
do require authentication, they MAY use either the IVOA-standard mech-
anisms or others that are not IVOA standards, but they MUST specify a
SecurityMethod element.
2.2 Commentary
The IVOA SSO profile allows the development of a “realm” of interoperable
services and clients. Service providers opt in to this realm by implementing
this current standard and by registering accordingly in the IVOA registry.
This allows clients to discover a secured service through the registry and
to be able to use it without being customized for the details of the specific
service.
Services within the Virtual Observatory that are not intended to be
widely interoperable need not opt in to the SSO realm. In particular, “pri-
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vate” services, accessed by web browsers and protected by passwords, are
allowed. However, these private services SHOULD be reworked to follow the
IVOA standard if they are later promoted to a wider audience.
An example of a registration for a secured interface follows.
<interface xmlns:vs=’ivo://www.ivoa.net/xml/VODataService/v1.1’
xsi:type=’vs:ParamHTTP’>
<accessURL>http://some.where/some/thing</accessURL>
<securityMethod>ivo://ivoa.net/sso#saml2.0</securityMethod>
</interface>
More than one securityMethod can be specified:
<interface xmlns:vs=’ivo://www.ivoa.net/xml/VODataService/v1.1’
xsi:type=’vs:ParamHTTP’>
<accessURL>http://some.where/some/thing</accessURL>
<securityMethod>ivo://ivoa.net/sso#saml2.0</securityMethod>
<securityMethod>ivo://ivoa.net/sso#cookie</securityMethod>
<securityMethod>ivo://ivoa.net/sso#OpenID</securityMethod>
</interface>
The order of the securityMethod elements determines the priority of the
method to use. In the example above, the preferred method to access the
service is SAML, then cookies, and finally, if the others are not available,
OpenID.
3 Approved authentication mechanisms
The following authentication mechanisms are approved for use in the SSO
profile.
• No authentication required.
• HTTP Basic Authentication
• Transport Layer Security (TLS) with passwords.
• Transport Layer Security (TLS) with client certificates.
• Cookies
• Open Authentication (OAuth)
• Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
• OpenID
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The mechanism is associated with the interface provided by the service
and registered in the IVOA registry.
Services that are registered with a IVOA registry as having a WebService
type interface (as described in the VOResource document) SHALL support
OAuth, or SHALL support cookies or SHALL support TLS with client cer-
tificates or SHALL require no authentication. Interfaces by which a user logs
in to the SSO system SHALL support either TLS with client certificates, or
TLS with passwords, or SAML or a combination of them.
3.1 List of approved authentication mechanisms and the
corresponding securityMethod
The approved authentication mechanisms and the corresponding securityMethod
to implement is listed in the table below.
SSO mechanism <securityMethod>
HTTP Basic Authentication ivo://ivoa.net/sso#BasicAA
TLS with password ivo://ivoa.net/sso#tls-with-password
TLS with client certificate ivo://ivoa.net/sso#tls-with-certificate
Cookies ivo://ivoa.net/sso#cookie
Open Authentication ivo://ivoa.net/sso#OAuth
SAML ivo://ivoa.net/sso#saml2.0
OpenID ivo://ivoa.net/sso#OpenID
4 HTTP Basic Authentication
4.1 Requirements
Services using HTTP basic authentication SHALL use the authentica-
tion mechanism described in the RFC7235 (Fielding, 2014) that updates
RFC2617 (Franks and Hallam-Baker et al., 1999). Interfaces using this mech-
anism SHALL be registered with the security method
ivo://ivoa.net/sso#BasicAA
4.2 Commentary
HTTP provides a simple challenge-response authentication framework that
can be used by a server to challenge a client request and by a client to provide
authentication information. The HTTP authentication framework does not
define a single mechanism for maintaining the confidentiality of credentials.
HTTP depends on the security properties of the underlying transport or
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session-level connection to provide confidential transmission of header fields.
Connection secured with TLS are RECOMMENDED prior to exchanging
any credentials.
The “HTTP basic authentication” SHOULD be used with particular at-
tention as sensible information (password) are sent over the wire in base64
encoding (which can be easily converted to plaintext) exposing the user to
the possibility her credentials to be stolen.
5 Details of TLS
5.1 Requirements
Services using Transport Layer Security (TLS) SHALL do so according to
the TLS v1.2 standard RFC5246 (Dierks and Rescorla, 2008).
5.2 Commentary
TLS supersedes the Secure Sockets Layer that is an outdated cryptographic
protocol. TLS v1.0 was based on SSL v3.0; the current version of TLS is
V1.2 described in by Dierks and Rescorla (2008). TLS v1.2 is backwards
compatible with TLS v1.0, TLS v1.1 and SSL v3.0. “TLS versions 1.0, 1.1,
and 1.2, and SSL 3.0 are very similar, and use compatible ClientHello mes-
sages; thus, supporting all of them is relatively easy.[...] TLS 1.2 clients that
wish to support SSL 2.0 servers MUST send version 2.0 CLIENT-HELLO
messages defined in SSL2.” (Dierks and Rescorla, 2008).
6 Details of TLS-with-client-certificate
6.1 Requirements
Certificates SHALL be transmitted and checked according to the TLS v1.2
standard RFC5246.
Services implementing TLS MUST support certificate chains including
proxy certificates according to RFC6818 (Yee, 2013).
Interfaces using this mechanism SHALL be registered with the security
method
ivo://ivoa.net/sso#tls-with-certificate
6.2 Commentary
When Mutual Certificate Authentication is configured for REST services,
both the client and the service perform identity verification or authentication
through X.509 certificates.
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The client authenticates the service during the initial SSL handshake,
when the server sends the client a certificate to authenticate itself.
7 Details of TLS-with-password
7.1 Requirements
The user-name and password SHALL be passed in the message protected by
the TLS mechanism, not as part of the mechanism itself.
Interfaces using this mechanism SHALL be registered with the security
method
ivo://ivoa.net/sso#tls-with-password
7.2 Commentary
“HTTP basic authentication” passes the user-name and password in the
HTTP headers, assuming that the credentials are not a natural part of the
message body. This standard applies the TLS-with-Password mechanism
only to the special case of logging in to the SSO realm. Hence, the user-
name and password are logically part of the message body, not the message
header.
8 The use of Cookies
8.1 Requirements
Cookie-Based Authentication uses server side cookies to authenticate the
user on every request. The way to manage cookies for authentication is
described in RFC6265 (Barth, 2013).
Interfaces using this mechanism SHALL be registered with the security
method
ivo://ivoa.net/sso#cookie
8.2 Commentary
RESTful web services MAY support session-based authentication, either by
establishing a session token via a POST or by using an API key as a POST
body argument or as a cookie. User-names, passwords, session tokens, and
API keys SHOULD not appear in the URL, as this can be captured in web
server logs, which makes them intrinsically valuable.
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Figure 2: Simplified picture of SAML 2.0 authentication.
9 Details on SAML authentication
9.1 Requirements
Services using SAML authentication mechanisms SHALL do so according
to the saml-core-2.0-os OASIS standard (Cantor and Kemp et al., 2005a).
SAML includes protocols and protocol bindings and security (Cantor and
Kemp et al., 2005b).
Interfaces using this mechanism SHALL be registered with the security
method
ivo://ivoa.net/sso#saml2.0
9.2 Commentary
SAML presumes two primary roles in any transaction: the organisation
where the identity is established, known as the Identity Provider (“IdP”),
or Asserting Party (“AP”); and the organisation which (for this transaction)
wants to use this identity, known as the Service Provider (“SP”), or Relying
Party (“RP”).
A user attempts to access an application with the Service Provider. The
SP needs to establish the identity of this user, and so sends an authentication
request to the Identity Provider.
The user authenticates with the IdP (IdP is taking care of the authen-
tication mechanisms and protocols e.g. Kerberos, ldap etc.) so the IdP can
send back an ‘Assertion’ to the SP. Now the SP knows who the user is, and
can process that user accordingly (see Fig. 2).
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Figure 3: Simplified picture of OAuth 2.0 authentication.
SAML2.0 protocol allows also to implement authentication service dis-
covery mechanisms. SAML2.0 defines a browser-based protocol by which a
centralized discovery service can provide a requesting service provider with
the unique identifier of an IdP that can authenticate the user.
10 Details on OAuth
10.1 Requirements
Services using OAuth authentication mechanisms SHALL do so according to
the RFC6749 (Hardt, 2012).
Interfaces using this mechanism SHALL be registered with the security
method
ivo://ivoa.net/sso#OAuth
10.2 Commentary
Open Authentication 2.0 (also in conjunction with OpenID Connect) is ac-
tually the adopted standard to handle identity in the framework of RESTful
web services. OAuth is used when an application is making a request on
behalf of a user.
OAuth introduces the notion of an ‘authorization token’, a ‘refresh token’
and Authorization Service (AS). The ‘authorization’ token states that the
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client application has the right to access services on the server (see Fig. 3).
However, it does not supersede any access control decisions that the server-
side application might make.
OAuth protocol can be implemented to delegate credential from an ap-
plication to another.
11 Details on OpenID
11.1 Requirements
Services using OpenID authentication mechanisms SHALL do so according
to the OpenID Foundation standards (OpenID, 2007)
Interfaces using this mechanism SHALL be registered with the security
method
ivo://ivoa.net/sso#OpenID
11.2 Commentary
OpenID is an open and decentralized authentication and identity system.
OpenID relying parties do not manage end user credentials such as pass-
words or any other sensitive information which makes authentication and
identity management much simpler and secure. In a RESTful environment
OpenID Connect (Sakimura and Bradley et al., 2014) is commonly adopted
as authentication solution. “OpenID Connect is a simple identity layer on
top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol, which allows computing clients to verify the
identity of an end-user based on the authentication performed by an au-
thorization server, as well as to obtain basic profile information about the
end-user in an interoperable and REST-like manner.” (OpenID, 2007).
12 Conclusions
This document presents a list of security standards that may be implemented
when developing a service that requires authentication. The list includes the
most frequently used standards at the time this document has been produced.
In this document we are presenting two types of SSO protocols: “local”
and “federated”. Local SSO provides solutions for keeping a repository of
user-names and passwords that could be used transparently across several
internal applications but it is local to one domain/service.
Federated identity means linking and using the electronic identities a
user has across several identity management systems. In simpler terms, a
service does not necessarily need to obtain and store users credentials in
order to authenticate them. Instead, the service (or the application) can use
an identity management system that is already storing a user’s electronic
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identity to authenticate the users given, of course, that the application trusts
that identity management system. Federated identities are convenient for
users, since they don’t have to keep a set of user-names and passwords for
every single application that they use and for service providers that do not
need to store and manage credentials.
Local SSO is managed by the following protocols: HTTP Basic Authen-
tication, Transport Layer Security (TLS) with passwords, cookies OAuth,
SAML, OpenID and Transport Layer Security (TLS) with client certificates
(thanks to the CA trust) are protocol that allow to implement federated
SSO.
The choice the authentication to use is related to the project/service
requirements, we suggest at least to implement a local authentication based
on Transport Layer Security (TLS) with passwords, that allows a reasonable
security framework for exchanging authentication tokens.
More complex projects/services that need to offer resources to large com-
munities should prefer federated identities. For example SAML2.0 is the pro-
tocol used to build the EduGain World wide identity federation for education
and research.
A VOResource SecurityMethod
This Appendix presents an extract of the VOResource Description XML
schema. Here we present the part of the schema regarding the SecurityMethod
element to facilitate the reader identify the relevant schema sections in the
VOResource Description.
<xs:schema xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:vr="http://www.ivoa.net/xml/VOResource/v1.0"
xmlns:vm="http://www.ivoa.net/xml/VOMetadata/v0.1"
targetNamespace="http://www.ivoa.net/xml/VOResource/v1.0"
elementFormDefault="unqualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified" version="1.02">
<xs:annotation>...</xs:annotation>
<xs:simpleType name="UTCTimestamp">...</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="UTCDateTime">...</xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="Resource">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="ValidationLevel">...</xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="Validation">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="AuthorityID">...</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="ResourceKey">...</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="IdentifierURI">...</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="ShortName">...</xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="Curation">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="ResourceName">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="Contact">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="Creator">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="Date">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="Content">...</xs:complexType>
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<xs:complexType name="Source">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="Type">...</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="ContentLevel">...</xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="Relationship">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="Organisation">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="Service">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="Rights">...</xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="Capability">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="Interface" abstract="true">
<xs:annotation>...</xs:annotation>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="accessURL" type="vr:AccessURL"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded">...</xs:element>
<xs:element name="securityMethod" type="vr:SecurityMethod"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation> the mechanism the client must employ to
gain secure access to the service.
</xs:documentation>
<xs:documentation> when more than one method is listed, each one
must be employed to gain access.
</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="version" type="xs:string" default="1.0">...</xs:attribute>
<xs:attribute name="role" type="xs:NMTOKEN">...</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="AccessURL">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="SecurityMethod">
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>a description of a security mechanism.</xs:documentation>
<xs:documentation> this type only allows one to refer to the mechanism via a URI.
Derived types would allow for more metadata.
</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:sequence/>
<xs:attribute name="standardID" type="xs:anyURI">
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation> A URI identifier for a standard security mechanism. </xs:documentation>
<xs:documentation>
This provides a unique way to refer to a security specification standard.
The use of an IVOA identifier here implies that a VOResource
description of the standard is registered and accessible.
</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="WebBrowser">...</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="WebService">...</xs:complexType>
</xs:schema>
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B Changes from Previous Versions
B.1 Changes from v. 1.01
• We remove all the references to SOAP as deprecated from IVOA
• We add new security methods and relative discussion sessions: OpenID,
SAML, Cookies, HTTP basic authentication
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